Charleroi, Sombreffe, and Quatre Bras check map

THE OPPOSING ARMIES The Anglo-Allied Army of the Low Countries Wellington’s Army comprised troops of many nationalities, speaking four principle languages—Englishmen, Dutch, Germans and French-speaking Belgians. The Germans were troops of the armies of Brunswick and Hanover. The King’s German Legion—raised also in Hanover —had served in the Peninsular War in the service of King George III who ruled as Duke of Hanover. The Netherlands had just been forcibly united with Belgium in March, upon word of Napoleon’s return to France. The unification forged between Dutch and Belgian units— many of which had fought under Napoleon the year before, and still wore their French-style uniforms—was necessarily fragile. Two Nassau units came from the German principality lying along the east bank of the Rhine opposite Koblenz. The line troops had been in the Netherlands service for a long time, and were commanded by a German Prince, Bernard of SaxeWeimar. The two Landwehr (militia) battalions under Kruse had just joined the army at the beginning of June. Among the English Troops, 15 understrength battalions remained in Holland after the 1814 campaign; in the Spring of 1815, these were shifted into Belgium and filled up with young conscripts. Three regiments had just returned from America upon the conclusion of the War of 1812-1814 (two of these were in Adam’s brigade of Clinton’s division). The cadre of these 26 battalions were veterans of the Spanish campaign, and they were the best troops available to Wellington. Veterans accounted for only about 60% of British troops; whereas all the KGL troops were veterans, most of the other contingents were green troops. Wellington welded this diverse force into a unified command by attaching one brigade of KGL and one of Hanoverian troops to each brigade of British regulars. These divisions were dispersed in their cantonments and needed half a day from receipt of their march orders to get underway. It would take days to assemble the entire army. The town of Quatre Bras was selected as the central concentration point, just five miles west of the Prussian Army's focus. The Prussian Army of the Lower Rhine Blücher’s Army included many troops from the minor German states who had fought on the other side in years past. About 57% of the Army were regular troops and the remainder militia or Landwehr. Some of these were solid veterans while those raised from territories recently-acquired by Prussia were of questionable reliability. There was no question about the leadership of the army however, beginning with the fire-breathing Marshal Blücher and his chief of staff, Gneisenau, who had been a part of the commission that re-built the Prussian Army after its defeat in 1807. Had Blücher not eluded capture at Ligny, however, it is unlikely that Gneisenau—who disliked the British—would have marched so speedily to their aid on the 18th.1 The Prussian Army occupied a wedge-shaped cantonment area along the Sambre and Meuse Rivers, with two brigades at its westernmost point extending to Charleroi and Fontaine 1 Sources agree that Wavre was chosen as their rallying point only because it was the one town all present could find on their maps. l’Eveque, to cover the hinge with the Anglo-Allied cantonments. The objective of this deployment was to delay any advance through Charleroi long enough for the two armies to concentrate on Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, which lie just nine miles apart. If allowed to unite their forces, the AngloPrussians would be able to oppose the French in a single body of 220,000 men. The zone between Charleroi, Sombreffe, and Quatre Bras was the critical lynch-pin that the French would have to seize. The French Armée du Nord The 128,165 men of L‘Armée du Nord, virtually all of them veterans, represented less than one-quarter of the manpower available to La Grande Armée. About 66,000 men of the line were required in the depots of the regiments, and up to 69,000 more line troops were assigned to other field armies, along with 50,000 mobilized National Guards. In the numerous fortresses on the frontiers, 85,500 National Guards were placed in garrison alongside 108,000 second and third line troops. A further 12,000 veterans, 46,000 conscripts, and 32,000 newlymobilized National Guards stood in reserve or were still in formation in the depots. The quality and devotion of the rank and file of L’Armée du Nord was not matched by the skill and dedication of their commanders. The years of constant warfare had taken their toll, and many great leaders who had survived did not rally to Napoleon in 1815. The commanding generals of his I and II Corps, d’Erlon and Reille, had never before commanded at that level, though Vandamme and Gérard were experienced and capable. At Imperial Headquarters, among the 73 officers only 12 (17%) had as much as 8 years experience on the General Staff. 2 The others were working together for the first time.3 Most notably absent was Marshal Berthier, who had taken care of the details for Napoleon since 1796. It is arguable that the critical errors committed by the inexperienced staff, and their inept Chief, Marshal Soult, cost Napoleon the campaign. The Emperor himself was not at his best in these warm early days of summer. His physical condition was deteriorating, leaving him without the stamina for long hours in the saddle and nights spent dictating orders. Aside from making a poor choice of Marshals—Ney and Grouchy—to lead the Army’s two wings, he compounded this by directing Marshal Grouchy beyond supporting distance after Ligny, detaching more than one third of his army in the wrong direction, and then failing to provide further orders to that Marshal during the 17th. 4 Having chosen Marshal Ney— whose great tactical skill was only for defensive fights—to lead his offensive battle at Waterloo, he retired for a nap at a crucial moment. Ney conducted the mid-phase of the battle like a rear-guard action in the Peninsular Campaign, failing to provide infantry support for his spectacular cavalry charges.  Louis Sheehan.